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11.       Introduction
High wage differences across countries constitute an important explanation for the
currently significant business practice of international outsourcing. For example, 1,10
€ per hour in China is very low to 27 € per hour e.g. in Denmark, Germany or
Norway. These wage differentials could lead to outsourcing (see e.g. Sinn (2007) for
details, see also Stefanova (2004) concerning the East-West dichotomy of
outsourcing). Glass and Saggi (2001) have studied the causes of outsourcing and its
effects and they found that higher international outsourcing lowers the relative wage
of domestic workers, while increases the profits and thereby creates greater incentives
for innovation.
It is known that higher wages affect worker’s productivity which is influenced
by their effort. Of course, according empirical evidence another way to stimulate the
effort is profit sharing. Profit sharing is an empirically important phenomenon in
many OECD countries. Pendleton et al. (2001) have presented detailed data on profit
sharing schemes in 14 EU-countries. For example, among western EU-countries in
1999/2000 a double-digit percentage of the workplaces uses profit sharing in Austria,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United
Kingdom. The lowest incidences are found in Denmark, Italy and Greece. For further
evidence regarding the incidence of profit sharing, we refer to the DICE data base,
collected by CESifo, http://www.CESifo.de as well as to Conyon and Freeman
(2001).
In terms of profit sharing Koskela and Stenbacka (2004a) have offered a
framework to analyze employment, effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face
stochastic revenue shocks. Moreover, they have investigated the interaction between
labour and credit market imperfections in the presence of profit sharing (see Koskela
and Stenbacka (2004b). In these papers they have analyzed profit sharing which is
committed, i.e. decided before wage negotiation. Koskela and Stenbacka (2006) have
also studied the differences between committed profit sharing and flexible profit
sharing, which is decided after wage formation. They have shown that the optimal
profit share under commitment is higher than under flexibility because through a
profit share commitment the firms can induce wage moderation. In these papers they
2have also studied the relationship between profit sharing and equilibrium
unemployment.
As profit sharing is now commonly incorporated in the compensation
schemes, and international outsourcing has recently increased among western EU-
countries and in the United States, then it is important to study their relationship and
implications for workers’ effort, wage formation and unemployment when profit
sharing is also a part of a compensation scheme in other industries or not. This is the
topic, which is our focus in this paper. We assume that firms commit to outsourcing
before profit sharing, wage negotiation, labour demand and effort determination.
Moreover, and importantly, we also analyze the implications of two alternative time
sequences in terms of profit sharing decision: (i) firms might commit profit sharing
before base wage negotiation or (ii) it might also sometimes to be relevant the case
according to which firms decide about profit sharing only after knowing the result of
base wage negotiation.
In our framework we analyze the following questions associated with
outsourcing and profit sharing under imperfectly competitive labour markets by using
the scenario without outsourcing: How does strategic outsourcing influence wage
formation, profit sharing and employee effort, when firms commit to optimal profit
sharing before wage formation or decide profit sharing after wage formation. We also
analyze the relationship between outsourcing, profit sharing and equilibrium
unemployment under various cases depending on whether in other industries profit
share is or is not a part of the compensation scheme. Finally, we briefly look at the
long-run perspective for the optimal production mode in terms of strategic
outsourcing.
First we show that in the presence of outsourcing the wage elasticity of labour
demand depends positively both on the amount of outsourcing and on the base wage,
but negatively on the size of profit sharing. As a result we also show that in the case
of committed profit sharing strategic outsourcing has a negative effect on wage
formation. This lies in conformity with empirics and results from our assumption of
perfect substitutability between outsourcing and effective domestic labour. Under
flexible profit sharing the wage is higher if optimal flexible profit share is small
enough. We also find that the profit share under commitment in the presence of
3outsourcing is not necessary larger than profit share under flexibility. Only if there is
a wage moderation effect in the committed case, we are in line with the literature,
which argues that the optimal profit share under commitment is higher than the profit
share under flexibility. If the wage rate increases by contrast the opposite result
occurs. In the flexible case we show that an increasing share of outsourcing or a
higher wage rate will lower the profit share so that there is a negative relationship
between outsourcing or base wage and optimal flexible profit share.
If there is no profit sharing as a part of outside option in other industries
higher outsourcing will decrease equilibrium unemployment while profit sharing will
have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment, but in the absence of
outsourcing higher profit sharing will decrease equilibrium unemployment. If there is
profit sharing a part of outside option in other industries outsourcing and profit
sharing will have ambiguous effects on equilibrium unemployment. Also in the
absence of outsourcing profit sharing will have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium
unemployment. In terms of optimal long-run strategic outsourcing wage moderation
will have the positive indirect marginal profit in the presence of committed profit
sharing due to wage moderation, but in the presence of flexible profit sharing this
effect is a priori ambiguous.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 presents the basic structure of theoretical
framework and two different time sequences in terms of profit sharing decision in the
presence of outsourcing activity. The determination of labour demand by firms and
effort by workers are presented in section 3. Section 4 investigates the wage
formation by monopoly labour union in the presence of strategic outsourcing and
committed profit sharing, and section 5 studies the wage formation by monopoly
labour union with strategic outsourcing and flexible profit sharing, which is decided
after wage formation. Section 6 explores the implications of strategic outsourcing and
different time decisions of profit sharing on equilibrium unemployment under various
cases. Section 7 studies briefly the optimal long-run outsourcing given the wage
formation, the profit sharing, the labour demand and the employee effort. Finally, we
present conclusions in section 8.
42. Basic Framework
We consider a representative firm and assume that output depends not only on the
units of labour but also on the effort supplied by workers, i.e. the workers’
productivity. This lies in conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis (for a survey
and several important seminal articles, see e.g. the book edited by Akerlof and Yellen
(1986)). We analyze two alternative timing decisions made representatives by the
firm, the labour union and the worker.
The timing structure (I) captures the idea that the representative firm commits
both to outsourcing and profit sharing in anticipation of wage determination. After
wage formation the representative firm determines employment and the representative
worker decides on effort provision. The partly alternative timing structure (II) will
change the timing of determination of profit sharing and wage determination by
keeping other timing aspects similar as in (I). In this case the representative firm is
flexible in the decision of profit sharing by deciding it after wage formation. We
summarize these alternative timing decisions in Figure 1.1
Figure 1: Alternative time sequences of decisions in terms of employment, effort,
wage formation, profit sharing and outsourcing
(I)   Strategic outsourcing and committed profit sharing:
   Stage 1               Stage 2                 Stage 3             Stage 4
   outsourcing       profit                    wage                 labour demand L  and
M                     sharing t               formation w     effort determination e
(II)  Strategic outsourcing and flexible profit sharing:
    Stage    1         Stage 2                  Stage 3             Stage 4
   outsourcing      wage                     profit               labour demand L  and
M                     formation w         sharing t         effort determination e
1 Whether profit sharing is committed or flexible in terms of base wage formation is an important new
topic for empirical research.
5This timing structure seems plausible when the implementation of a production mode
with outsourcing requires irreversible investments concerning the establishment of a
network of foreign suppliers. Of course, the relative timing of wage formation in the
presence of outsourcing might be different in certain circumstances. Such a reversed
timing structure would be relevant if the firms would flexible adjust their production
mode, and decide whether to initiate foreign outsourcing once the domestic wage is
determined.2
In the following sections we turn to an analysis of these two alternative
decisions taking place at the different stages of the interaction between the
representative firm, the monopoly labour union and the representative worker by
using the backward induction and solving the game in reverse order.
3. Labour Demand and Employee Effort
Here we characterize the optimal labour demand by the representative firm and the
effort by the representative worker in stage 4 by taking both profit sharing t , wage
formation w , and outsourcing M  as given. The technology is assumed to satisfy the
following revenue function3
( ) ( )a
a
MeLMLeR += 1,,                                             (1)
2 Skaksen (2004) has analyzed this case using a Cobb-Douglas production function also in the case of
homogenous domestic labour, but both in the absence of effort determination of workers and profit
sharing of firms. Also Braun and Scheffel (2007) have developed a simple two-stage game between a
monopoly union and a firm by assuming that the union sets wages before the firm decides on the
degree of outsourcing and the level of production. They also abstract from effort determination of
workers and profit sharing of firms. They argue that under flexible outsourcing the costs of outsourcing
has an ambiguous effect on the wage set by the union.
3 Specifying the inverse product demand function according to a monopolistic product market
competition (for details, see the seminal paper by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) in a simple way as
( )a
a
--= 1
1 Dp , ( )1,0Îa , gives the following inverse elasticity of demand ( )a-=- 1/ pDpD
so that 1
1
1/ >
-
=-
a
DpDp . By assuming ( ) MelMLeF +=,, and DF = gives another
suggestion for (1). In what follows we do not elaborate the potential role of product market competition
for our issues.
6where L  is unit of labour, e  describes the effort determination, M  indicates the
amount of outsourcing and 10 << a . We assume that outsourcing and effective
labour are perfect substitutes. Outsourcing cost is defined by the convex function
( )Mc with ( ) ( ) .0'',' >McMc
The disutility of effort is assumed to satisfy the following convex function
( ) gg /1eeg =  with 10 << g , i.e. ( ) ( ) 0'',' >egeg . The individual utility function for
the employed worker is (2a) and for the unemployed worker (2b)
( )eg
L
wu -+= pt                                                     (2a)
bu =                                                                           (2b)
where w  is the base wage, t  is the profit share, p  captures the firm’s profit and
b stands for the unemployed worker’s exogenous outside option.
The profit function can now be expressed as
( ) ( )McwLMeL --+= a
a
p 1 .                                   (3)
Given ,M w  and e  the first-order condition for the firm’s optimal labour demand can
be expressed as
( ) ( ) 01 =-+= -- weMeLL ap                                        (4)
and the second-order condition ( )( ) ( ) .01 22 <+--= -- eMeLLL aap  The first-order
condition can be re-expressed  as
e
MewL -= -- 1hh                                                         (5)
where the direct wage elasticity of labour demand is ( ) 11/1/ >-=-= ah LwLw .
7According to (5) { { { ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
=
+--
eMwLL ,,  so that higher wage rate and higher outsourcing,
which is a perfect substitute for domestic labour, will decrease labour demand.
Moreover, higher employee’s effort will increase labour demand. Labour demand (5)
does not directly depend on profit sharing, which lies in conformity with empirical
evidence (see e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997)).
The first-order condition in terms of effort determination for equation (2a) is
( ) 0' =-= eg
L
u ee p
t .                                                 (6)
Using ( ) ( ) 1/1' -= geeg  and ( ) ( ) LMeLe ap --+= 1  equation (6) implies
( )gt we =                                                                      (7)
where
e
e tg t=  is the elasticity of effort with respect to profit sharing (see about this,
Koskela and Stenbacka (2006)). Therefore the optimal effort by worker is a positive
function of both base wage, w , and profit sharing, t , i.e.
w
eew
g
=  and
t
g
t
ee = , so
that profit sharing and base wage enhance productivity by increasing effort provision
and thereby affects labour demand indirectly. But outsourcing will have no effect in
the case of perfect substitutability between outsourcing M and employee effort e .4
4 This finding lies in conformity with empirics (see e.g. Booth and Frank (1999), Cable and Wilson
(1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), Kruse (1992) and Wadhwani and Wall (1990)). Of course, we
have to mention that these issues have not been studied to our knowledge empirically in the presence of
outsourcing.
84.     Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union with Strategic
Outsourcing and Committed Profit Sharing
Now we continue the timing structure (I) to analyze the case, where the representative
firm commits to the profit share prior to the base wage formation and by taking
outsourcing as given and allowing for their effects on labour demand and effort
determination.
4.1.     Wage Formation
By analyzing the base wage formation by monopoly labour union under committed
outsourcing and committed profit sharing in stage 3 the objective function of
monopoly labour union is
( ) ( ) bNLegLbwV +-+-= pt                                (8)
where b captures the exogenous minimum income for all labour union members N .
Maximizing (8) in terms of base wage subject to labour demand (5), effort
determination (7) and given outsourcing and profit sharing gives the following first-
order condition
( ) ( ) ( ) 0' =--+-+= wwwww eeLgLegbwLLV pt .               (9)
This first-order condition for the monopoly labour union’s base wage can be now
expressed as follows 5
5 By calculating the following parts ( ) ( ) 0' 1111/1 >=== -+-+-- tgtg ggggg weeeeg ww , and
( ) ( ) ( ) 011
11
<--=úû
ù
êë
é +--=++-= -- LeMeLLLeMeLL www gp hh , we can rewrite the
first-order condition as follows
( ) ( ) 010 =úû
ù
êë
é -----+Û= ww
L
wL
wbw
L
wL
w
w
LV www gtgtgt  which gives (10).
9( ) ( ) bw úû
ù
ê
ë
é
---
=
tgth
h
11ˆ
ˆ
(10)
where
( ) ghhgghh ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +=+÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +-=-º 11111ˆ
eL
M
eL
M
eL
M
L
wLw               (11)
is the total wage elasticity of labour demand (see Appendix 1 for details). Therefore,
the total wage elasticity hˆ  depends on the base wage rate, the amount of outsourcing
and the effort determination. This means that it should be emphasized that the wage
determination (10) is expressed in the implicit (not explicit) form, because the wage
elasticity of labour demand associated with the mark-up
( ) ( )úû
ù
ê
ë
é
---
=
tgth
h
11ˆ
ˆcA depends also on the base wage.
The base wage elasticity of labour demand depends positively on the amount
of outsourcing, i.e.
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 0111ˆ 2 >÷ø
ö
ç
è
æ +
-
=
+
-=
eL
M
eLeL
MeL
M
ghghh .                  (12a)
This positive relationship results from the fact that higher outsourcing will increase
the ratio between outsourcing and effective labour, i.e. )/(eLM . This lies in
conformity with empirics (see e.g. Hasan et al (2007), Slaughter (2001) and Senses
(2006)).
Next we characterize the relationship between the base wage elasticity of
labour demand and the base wage rate which comes via eL , i.e. we have
( ) ( ) 01ˆ
2
>+úû
ù
êë
é -= MeL
w
M
eLw
gh
h .                           (12b)
Therefore, the wage elasticity depends positively on the base wage rate in the
10
presence of outsourcing. In the absence of outsourcing, this effect is, however, zero,
i.e. .0ˆ
0
=
=Mw
h
The relationship between the base wage elasticity and profit sharing can be
written in the following way
( ) ( )
( )
01ˆ 2 <ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é +-
-=
eL
eLLeM tt
t ghh                           (12c)
where 0>=
t
g
t
ee  and ( ) 01 22 >+-= -- e
MeeewL tt
hh
t h  so that
( )MeLeLLe +=+ h
t
g
tt . Equation (12c) can be written as
( ) .011ˆ
2
<÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +
-
-=
eL
M
eL
M
t
ggh
ht  The base wage elasticity depends negatively on
profit sharing, because higher profit sharing will decrease the ratio between
outsourcing and effective labour, i.e. eLM / . It is important to emphasize that there
will be no effect in the absence of outsourcing, i.e. .0ˆ
0
=
=Mt
h
We can now summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 1: In the presence of outsourcing the wage elasticity of
labour demand depends positively on the amount of outsourcing and on
the base wage and negatively on the size of profit sharing.
In the absence of outsourcing the total wage elasticity is slightly different. In this case
the total wage elasticity is smaller, i.e. ( )ghhh 1ˆ
0
--=
=M
 (see about this, Koskela
and Stenbacka (2006)). This implies the following monopoly labour union’s base
wage formation
( )
[ ] ( ) ( ) bw M tgtghh
ghh
-----
--
=
= 11)1(
1
0
.                               (13)
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Next we characterize the comparative statics in a different way than in the
explicit formulations. After characterizing the base wage elasticity of labour demand
in terms of various parameters we now analyze the effects of these parameters on the
wage formation by thy monopoly labour union both under committed outsourcing and
committed profit sharing.
Differentiating equation (10) with respect to the base wage and outsourcing
gives (see Appendix 2)
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
ˆ
ˆ
1
1
1ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
1ˆ
11ˆ
ˆ
1ˆ
<
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+-
-
-
-=
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é -
+---
-
-=
h
h
t
gth
h
h
h
th
tgth
h
th
w
w
w
w
dM
dw
w
M
w
M
.  (14)
Therefore, higher outsourcing will decrease the base wage formation because higher
outsourcing will increase wage elasticity of labour demand. This lies in conformity
with empirics under our assumption according to which there is substitutability
between outsourcing and domestic labour (this also lies in conformity with empirics,
see e.g. Munch and Skaksen (2005)).
Differentiating equation (10) with the base wage and profit sharing gives
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
?
ˆ
ˆ
1
1
1ˆ
1
ˆ1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
1ˆ
11ˆ
ˆ
ˆ1ˆ1ˆ
=
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+-
-
-
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
+
-=
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é -
+---
-+-
-=
h
h
t
gth
t
gh
h
h
h
th
tgth
h
ghhth
t
tt
w
w
w
w
d
dw
ww
    (15)
(see Appendix 2). Therefore under this framework with outsourcing the effect of
committed profit sharing on the base wage formation by monopoly labour union is a
priori ambiguous because under outsourcing the profit sharing will have a negative
effect to wage formation via the mark-up, but also a positive effect due to a negative
effect on wage elasticity.
In the absence of outsourcing equation (15) can be re-expressed as follows
12
( )( ) ( )( )[ ]
( )( )( ) ( )[ ] 0111
111
2
0
<
-----
-----
-=
= tgtghh
ghhghh
t Md
dw (16)
so that profit sharing will decrease the mark-up of wage formation.6
We can now summarize our findings as follows
Proposition 2: In the presence of outsourcing and given committed
profit sharing a higher share of outsourcing will decrease the wage,
whereas profit sharing has an ambiguous effect on the base wage. But
in the absence of outsourcing higher profit sharing will decrease the
base wage.
4.2. Committed Profit Sharing
In the timing structure of decisions (I) in stage 2 the representative firm commits to
profit sharing so that profit is maximized subject to labour demand (5), effort
determination (7) and wage formation by the monopoly labour union (10) and by
taking outsourcing as given,  i.e.
( ) ( ) ( )úû
ù
êë
é --+-= McwLMeLMax at a
tp
11                      (17a)
s.t.
e
MewL -= -- 1hh                                                     (17b)
( )gt we =                                                                 (17c)
( ) ( ) bw úû
ù
ê
ë
é
---
=
ttgh
h
11ˆ
ˆ
                                         (17d)
6 Using
a
h
-
=
1
1
 we have ( ) 0
1
11 >
-
-
=--
a
agghh  and
( )( ) ( ) 0
1
1111 >
-
-
-=---
a
gaggghh  so that 0
0
<
=Md
dw
t
.
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The first-order condition is ( ) 01 =-+- tptp , where the indirect profit can be
expressed as [ ] ( )Mc
e
wMew -+
-
= -- 11
1
1 hh
h
p . The derivative of profit with respect
to profit sharing by allowing for the wage and effort effects of profit sharing is
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -=
w
wwL t
g
t
p tt                                                     (18)
because 0=tL  due to the envelope theorem ( 0=Lp ).
7 Next we have to solve the
optimal committed profit sharing by using equations (18) and the indirect profit in
( ) 01 =-+- tptp  so that given outsourcing M  the optimal committed profit
sharing can be presented as (see Appendix 3)
( )
( ) ( ) ( )ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
--+÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ --+
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ --
=
wL
Mc
eL
M
w
w
w
w
c
111
1
hh
t
gh
t
gh
t
t
t
.              (19a)
This is an implicit form because concerning the RHS of (19a) employee effort, labour
demand and base wage formation depend on profit sharing.
In the absence of outsourcing the optimal committed profit sharing can be re-
expressed from (19a) as follows
( )
( ) ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ --+
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ --
=
=
w
w
w
w
M
c
t
gh
t
gh
t
t
t
11
1
0
                              (19b)
7 The derivative ( ) ( ) úû
ù
êë
é -+-+-
-
= ---- 2
211 11
1
1
e
weew
Meewwew ttt
hh
t
hh
t hhh
p  gives
( )Mew
w
w
e
w
-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -= - hhtt
t
g
t
p
1
  so that we have (18).
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(see about this, Koskela and Stenbacka (2006)). Comparison between (19a) and (19b)
shows that in the presence of outsourcing the optimal committed profit share is
smaller than in the  absence of outsourcing, i.e.
0=
<
M
cc tt  because 0<
w
w tt  in the
absence of outsourcing by increasing profit sharing, while it is ambiguous and thereby
smaller in the presence of outsourcing. Moreover, in the denominator of (19a)
( ) ( ) 01 >--
wL
Mc
eL
M hh  and it is zero in (19b). In both cases (19a) and (19b) higher
wage elasticity with respect to profit sharing, ww /tt , will have a negative effect on
the optimal committed profit sharing.
We can now summarize our findings as follows
Proposition 3: In the presence of outsourcing the optimal committed
profit share is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing because in the
absence of outsourcing profit share elasticity of wage formation is
negative, but in the presence of outsourcing it is a priori ambiguous.
5.   Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union with Strategic
Outsourcing and Flexible Profit Sharing
We now use the timing structure (II) to analyze the wage formation before the flexible
profit sharing by the representative firm. After that and by taking outsourcing as given
and committed before wage and profit sharing determinations we allowing for their
effects on labour demand and employee effort.
5.1.      Flexible Profit Sharing
First we study the optimal profit sharing in stage 3 decided after outsourcing and
wage formation subject to labour demand and employee effort determinations. Now
the profit sharing is decided to maximize profit by taking both the base wage and the
outsourcing as given, i.e.
15
( ) ( ) ( )úû
ù
êë
é --+-= McwLMeLMax at a
tp
11                      (20a)
s.t.
e
MewL -= -- 1hh                                                     (20b)
( )gt we =                                                                  (20c)
The first-order condition is similar as in the case of committed profit sharing  in terms
of the first-order condition, i.e. ( ) 01 =-+- tptp , where the indirect profit is
[ ] ( )Mc
e
wMew -+
-
= -- 11
1
1 hh
h
p . But as we show the optimal profit sharing is
slightly different in the case of flexible profit sharing decision.
To allow for the envelope theorem due to 0=Lp  so that tL  is not taken into
account, the partial derivative of the profit in terms of profit sharing is
wL
e
wMewe
e
wMeew ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ=úû
ù
êë
é -÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ=-= ----
t
g
t
g
p hhtt
hh
t
11
2
21  so that the first-order
condition can be written as ( ) ( )wLMc
e
wMwL t
t
g
h
h
h
-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ=-
-
+
-
1
11
1 . This can be
solved for the following optimal flexible profit sharing in the presence of outsourcing
( )
( ) ( ) ( )úû
ù
êë
é --+-+
-
=
wL
Mc
eL
M
f
111
1
hhgh
ght .                    (21a)
This is also like in the case of committed optimal profit sharing (see equation (19a))
an implicit form because both employee effort and labour demand also depend on
profit sharing (see equations (5) and (7)) concerning the RHS of (21a).
In the absence of outsourcing profit sharing can be expressed as follows
( )
( )gh
ght
11
1
0 -+
-
=
=M
f .                                               (21b)
Comparison between (21a) and (21b) shows that in the presence of outsourcing the
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optimal flexible profit share is smaller than in the  absence of outsourcing, i.e.
0=
<
M
ff tt  because ( ) ( ) .01 >--
wL
Mc
eL
M hh
Comparing the relationship between the optimal profit share under
commitment (equation (19a)) and under flexibility (equation (21a)) it depends on
what is the relationship between the wage rate and profit sharing.  If tw  is negative
(positive) then optimal profit share under commitment is larger (smaller) than that
associated with flexibility, fc tt > ( fc tt < ). Of course in the absence of outsourcing
we have  higher optimal committed profit share than optimal flexible profit share, i.e.
00 ==
>
M
f
M
c tt   by comparing equations (19b) and (21b).
Now we analyze the effects of the parameters outsourcing and base wage on
flexible profit sharing under strategic outsourcing (see Appendix 4 for details). The
effect of M  can be obtained by differentiating (21a) to get8
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2
111
11
1
111
11
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
úû
ù
êë
é --+-+
-
+
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
úû
ù
êë
é --+-+
-
-
=
wL
Mc
eL
M
X
eL
wL
Mc
eL
M
Z
eL
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8 In (22a) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )MeL
wL
McMeL
eL
MX hh
t
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t
gh +--++-= 112  which we re- write so
that holds ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .011 <ú
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æ ---= eL
wL
McMeL
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MX hhhh
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g
  We specify
the parameter Z as ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'11 >÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +--÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +=
eL
McMc
w
e
eL
MZ hh  which is equivalent to
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'11 >--+--
w
eMc
wL
Mc
eL
M hhhh . Also we assume although 0<X  that
( ) ( ) 01 2 >+- tgh XeL .
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and using equation (21a), i.e. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t
ghhhgh 1111 -=--+-+
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eL
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Our assumptions, 0>Z  and 0<X , but ( ) ( ) 01 2 >+- tgh XeL , sound to be
reasonable if optimal flexible profit sharing is small enough so that in this case
optimal flexible profit sharing depends negatively on outsourcing.
Differentiating (21a) with respect to base wage gives9
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Using equation (21a), we get
9 In (23a) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )hh
t
ghg ˆ111 2 --++-=
w
e
w
McMeL
weL
MY . For Y  holds 0>Y  which
means that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1ˆ11 2 -->+- hh
t
ghg
w
eMcMeL
eL
M
 where
( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +--=-
eL
M
hhgh 111ˆ  so that ( ) ( ) ( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +-->+
eL
M
w
eMcMeL
eL
M
hhh
t
g
h 112 .
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If optimal flexible profit sharing is small enough, then under this assumption
( ) ( ) 01 2 >+- tgh XeL  so that the base wage rate will have the negative effect on
flexible profit sharing, while the base wage rate will have no effect in the absence of
outsourcing, i.e. .0
0
=
¶
¶
=M
f
w
t
We can now summarize our findings as follows
Proposition 4: In the presence of outsourcing and flexible profit
sharing under reasonable assumptions higher base wage and higher
outsourcing will decrease profit sharing but in the absence of
outsourcing the base wage will have no effect on flexible profit sharing.
5.2.  Wage Formation under Flexible Profit Sharing
We now analyze the base wage formation in stage 2 by monopoly labour union under
committed outsourcing and flexible profit sharing. The objective function can be
written as
( ) ( ) bNLegLbwV +-+-= pt                              (24)
where b captures the exogenous minimum income for all labour union members.
Maximizing (24) in terms of the base wage subject to labour demand (5), effort
determination (7), and profit sharing determination (23b), gives
( ) ( ) ( ) 0' =--++-+= wwwwww eeLgLegbwLLV tppt              (25)
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where there is the new term wtp  compared with the case of committed profit sharing
formulation (9). Using the assumption (23b) with respect to base wage gives
0<wtp . Therefore higher wage rate will have negative effect on flexible profit
sharing so that the base wage by monopoly labour union under committed outsourcing
and flexible profit sharing is smaller than in the case of committed outsourcing and
committed profit sharing. By using the earlier calculations according to which
( )Lw gp --= 1 and ( ) gt=weeg '  we can solve the first order condition (25) as follows
( ) ( ) b
L
w w h
p
ttgth ˆ11ˆ =÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ ----                            (26)
where there is the new term
Lw
pt-  compared with the case of committed profit
sharing. Rewriting of (26) gives the following implicit wage formation equation  (see
Appendix 5)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
bb
L
w
w
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
G+---
=
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
----
=
)1(11ˆ
ˆ
11ˆ
ˆ
gttgth
h
pttgth
h               (27)
with ( ) ( ) 21 tgh XeL
wY
+-
=G . If optimal flexible profit sharing is small enough, then
0>G  so that in this case in the presence of outsourcing the denominator in (27) is
smaller than the one in (10) so that under 0>G  the mark-up in terms of wage
formation is higher under flexible profit share.
We can summarize this as follows
Proposition 5: In the presence of outsourcing and flexible profit
sharing the base wage formation is bigger than in the case of committed
profit sharing if optimal flexible profit sharing is small enough.
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6. Strategic Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium
Unemployment
We now move on to explore the implications of profit sharing and outsourcing on
equilibrium unemployment. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium unemployment
as a function of institutional features of labor market, defined by the benefit
replacement ratio, the structure of the compensation system and the given
outsourcing.
In the case of committed profit sharing the base wage formation by the
monopoly labour union has the form
bAw cii =                                                                      (28)
in industry i , where the  wage mark-up is defined by ( ) ( ) 111ˆ
ˆ
>
---
=
tgth
hc
iA . For
simplicity, we focus on the situation with identical industries in terms of the wage
mark-up so that .cci AA =  In a general equilibrium the outside option b  will be re-
interpreted to be the relevant outside option. We specify two alternative outside
options. If in other industries there is no profit sharing, then the outside option can be
specified as
( ) Buwub cc +-= 1                                                    (29a)
where cu  denotes the unemployment rate in the case of committed profit sharing, B
the unemployment benefit and w  is the base wage formation and an unemployed
worker faces the probability ( )cu-1  of being employed in another industry (for a
standard justification we refer e.g. to Nickell and Layard (1999) and Layard et al.
(2005), pp. 100-101). If the compensation scheme is similar of being employment in
other industries, the outside option can be specified as
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( ) Bu
L
wub cc +÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +-=
p
t1 .                                    (29b)
Equation (29b) captures the idea that all identical industries adopt profit sharing so
that an unemployed worker faces the probability ( )cu-1  of being employed in
another industry, which makes use of a similar compensation scheme. We further
restrict in these outside options to the case of a constant benefit-replacement ratio
wBq /=  in the presence of unemployment so that .10 << q
Combining (28) and (29a) and the assumption of a constant benefit-
replacement ration, q , we can rewrite the wage equation (28) as follows
( ) qwuAwuAw cccc +-= 1 . The aggregate unemployment rate can now be expressed
according to
q
Au
cc
-
-
=
1
11
                                                                (30)
where the assumption is cA
q 1< . In the presence of outsourcing
( ) ( )tgth
h
---
=
11ˆ
ˆcA  and in the absence of outsourcing
( )[ ]( ) ( ) 1111
)1(
0
>
-----
--
=
= tgtghh
ghh
M
cA . Combining (28) and (29b) and the
assumption of a constant benefit-replacement ration, q , we can rewrite the wage
equation (28) as follows ( ) ( ) qwuA
L
uAwuAw cccccc +-+-= pt11 . The aggregate
unemployment rate can now be expressed according to
wL
q
wLAu
cc
pt
pt
+-
+-
=
1
11
. This can
be presented in the presence of outsourcing as follows
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where ( ) ( )
wL
Mc
eL
MK 11 -++= hh  and the assumption is cA
q 1< . In the absence of
outsourcing under the monopoly labour union’s wage formation but committed profit
sharing in all industries we have the following equilibrium unemployment
1
1
1
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M
c .                                     (31b)
First we look at the implications of outside option (29a) on equilibrium
unemployment according to which there is no profit sharing as a part of outside option
in other industries. In the presence of outsourcing differentiating (30) with respect to
outsourcing and profit sharing gives
( )[ ]
0
1 2
<
-
=
Aq
A
dM
du cMc    and
( )[ ]
?
1 2
=
-
=
A
A
d
du cc
ht
t              (32)
where
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
0
11ˆ
ˆ1
2 <---
-
-=
tgth
ht Mc
MA  and
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
?
11ˆ
ˆ1ˆˆ1
2 =---
-+-
-=
tgth
ghhht t
t
cA
Therefore, if there is no profit sharing as a part of outside option in other industries
higher outsourcing will decrease equilibrium unemployment while profit sharing will
have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment. In the absence of
outsourcing higher profit sharing will decrease equilibrium unemployment because in
this case 0
0
<
=M
cAt .
Next we look at the implications of outside option (29b) on equilibrium
unemployment according to which there is profit sharing as a part of outside option in
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all identical industries. In the presence of outsourcing differentiating (31a) with
respect to outsourcing gives (see Appendix 6)10
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The impact of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment in this case is a priori
ambiguous for the following reasons. Higher outsourcing will decrease the mark-up
and therefore will have a negative effect on equilibrium unemployment due to lower
wage elasticity of labour demand, but higher outsourcing will also increase profit
relative to wage costs so that outside option will increase and therefore will have a
positive effect on equilibrium unemployment.
In the presence of outsourcing differentiating (31a) with respect to profit
sharing gives11 (see Appendix 6)
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According to (34a) the impact of profit sharing on equilibrium unemployment in this
case is a priori ambiguous for the following reasons. Higher profit sharing will have
an ambiguous effect on the mark-up but higher profit sharing will also increase profit
relative to wage costs so that outside option will increase and therefore will have a
positive effect on equilibrium unemployment.
10 Because our former assumption we can show that holds
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11 This result holds because ?=cAt  (see equation (15)) and
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In the absence of outsourcing equation (34a) by using 0=tK   and 1=K   can
be re-expressed as
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which is also ambiguous in terms of equilibrium unemployment.
In the case of flexible profit sharing the base wage formation by the monopoly
labour union has the form bAw fii =  in industry i , where the mark-up is defined by
( ) ( ) ( ) G-----= gttgth
h
111ˆ
ˆf
iA , which is smaller than in the case of committed
profit sharing. By one cannot fixed the effects of outsourcing and profit sharing on the
mark-up due to the new part in the denominator of the mark-up, i.e. ( ) G-- gt1 . The
equilibrium unemployment in the flexible case when there is no profit sharing in other
industries is expressed in (35a) and when also profit sharing is in the compensation
scheme in other industries in (35b)
q
Au
ff
-
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=
1
11
(35a)
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(35b)
In the absence of outsourcing under the monopoly labour union’s wage formation we
have the following equilibrium unemployment in the presence of flexible profit
sharing in all industries
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where ( )( )[ ]( ) ( ) 1111
1
0
>
-----
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=
= ttgghh
ghh
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fA  and 0=G . Implications of outside
option (29a) gives 0
0
<
=M
f
d
du
t
 and outside option (29b) gives ?
0
=
=M
f
d
du
t
 like in
the case of committed profit sharing.
We can now summarize equilibrium unemployment aspects in the presence of
outsourcing and profit sharing when labour markets are imperfectly competitive as
follows.
Proposition 6:
(1) If there is no profit sharing as a part of outside option in other
industries higher outsourcing will decrease equilibrium
unemployment while profit sharing will have an ambiguous effect
on equilibrium unemployment, but in the absence of outsourcing
higher profit sharing will decrease equilibrium unemployment.
(2) If there is profit sharing as a part of outside option in other
industries outsourcing and profit sharing will have ambiguous
effects on equilibrium unemployment both under committed and
flexible profit sharing. Also in the absence of outsourcing profit
sharing will have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium
unemployment.
7. Optimal Strategic Outsourcing
So far we have restricted to a medium or short-run perspective where the firm has
So far we have restricted to a medium or short-run perspective where the firm has
committed to the magnitude of outsourcing activity prior to wage determination,
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profit sharing, labour demand and employee effort. Now we turn to explore the initial
stage 1, where the firm commits to the outsourcing activity. It is assumed that the
long-run production mode decision may internalize the effect of the share of
outsourced production on wage formation depending on the time sequence decision of
profit sharing.
In the long-run the firm is assumed to have rational expectations regarding
subsequent outcomes and determines the magnitude optimal committed outsourcing
so as to maximize profit ( ) [ ] ( )÷÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
--+
-
-=
-
McwLMeL
h
h
h
htp
1
)
1
1  subject to labour
demand (5) (allowing for the envelope theorem according to 0=Lp ) and effort
determination (7). Morevoer, in the presence of committed profit sharing profit
maximization is also subject to wage formation (10) and profit sharing (19a)
(allowing for the envelope theorem according to 0=tp ), while in the presence of
flexible profit sharing also subject to profit sharing (21a) (allowing for the envelope
theorem according to 0=tp ) and wage formation (27).
Allowing the envelope theorem both in terms of the optimal profit sharing
( 0=tp ) and the optimal labour demand ( 0=Lp ) we differentiate
[ ] ( )McwLMeL --+
-
=
-
h
h
h
hp
1
1
 with respect to M . Using MeweL -= - hh  and
e
MwewwL -= -- 11 hh  we can express the profit function as
( )Mc
e
Mwew -+
-
= -- 11
1
1 hh
h
p .                           (37)
Differentiating (37) with respect to M  and allowing both its direct effects and the
indirect effects via the base wage and the effort determination gives
( ) 0'2211 =--+++-= ---- Mcwee
Mww
e
M
e
wweewwew MwMMwMM
hhhhp . This can
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be written as follows ( ) 0'11 =-+úû
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so that we have the first-order condition
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The second-order condition is ( ) ( ) ( ) .0''12 <----= McLw
e
w
MM
M
MM ggp
In addition to the direct marginal cost )(' Mc  there is the direct marginal profit
e
w  via outsourcing (see equation (38)) and the indirect marginal effects via the effect
of outsourcing on wage , i.e. ( )g-- 1LwM  .  In the presence of committed profit
sharing outsourcing moderates base wage so that the marginal profit will increase via
( ) 01 >-- gLwM . But in the presence of flexible profit sharing the indirect marginal
profit ( )g-- 1LwM  in terms of outsourcing is a priori ambiguous, because in this case
the wage effect of outsourcing can be negative or positive.
We can summarize this as follows
Proposition 7: In terms of optimal long-run strategic outsourcing wage
moderation will have the positive indirect marginal profit in the
presence of committed profit sharing due to wage moderation, but in the
presence of flexible profit sharing this effect is a priori ambiguous.
8.      Conclusions
We have analyze the following questions associated with outsourcing and profit
sharing under imperfectly competitive labour markets by using the scenario without
outsourcing: How does strategic outsourcing, which we assume to be substitute for
effective labour, influence wage formation, profit sharing and employee effort when
firms commit to optimal profit sharing before wage formation or decide profit sharing
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after wage formation. We also have studied the relationship between outsourcing,
profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment as a function of various institutional
features of the labour market. Finally, we have characterized the long-run perspective
for the optimal production mode in terms of strategic outsourcing.
We have shown that in the presence of outsourcing the wage elasticity of
labour demand depends positively on the amount of outsourcing and on the wage, but
negatively on the size of profit sharing. As a result it has been presented that in the
case of committed profit sharing strategic outsourcing has a negative effect on wage
formation. This lies in conformity with empirics and results from our assumption of
perfect substitutability between outsourcing and effective domestic labour. Under
flexible profit sharing the wage is higher if optimal flexible profit share is small
enough. But the impact of profit share on wage formation under commitment in the
presence of outsourcing is not necessary larger than profit share under flexibility.
Only if there is a wage moderation effect in the committed case we are in line with the
literature, which argues that the optimal profit share under commitment is higher than
the profit share under flexibility. If the wage rate increases by contrast the opposite
result occurs. In the flexible case we show that a higher wage rate will lower the profit
share so that there is negative relationship between base wage and optimal flexible
profit share.
If there is no profit sharing as a part of outside option in other industries higher
outsourcing will decrease equilibrium unemployment while profit sharing will have
an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment, but in the absence of outsourcing
higher profit sharing will decrease equilibrium unemployment. If there is profit
sharing as a part of outside option in other industries outsourcing and profit sharing
will have ambiguous effects on equilibrium unemployment. Also in the absence of
outsourcing profit sharing will have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium
unemployment. Finally, in terms of optimal long-run strategic outsourcing wage
moderation will have the positive indirect marginal profit in the presence of
committed profit sharing due to wage moderation, but in the presence of flexible
profit sharing this effect is a priori ambiguous.
There are several new research topics associated with these issues. One
important issue is to study the implications of labour taxation and labor tax reforms on
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effort, labour demand wage formation, profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment
in the presence of outsourcing. Another topics are to extend the framework to allow
for heterogeneity of workers in the domestic country in the presence of outsourcing
and to allow  for wage negotiations between labour unions and firms. Finally, it is
also important to do empirical research associated with various results we have
presented.
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APPENDIX 1:
The derivative of labour demand (5) with respect to the base wage is
( ) 2211 1 e
MeeewewL www +-+-=
----- hhhh hh  so that we have
( ) ( )( ) ggghhh hhhhhh
e
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e
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e
M
e
weewewwL www -+-=---=-
------ 11 111 .   (A1)
This leads to (11).  The effect of the base wage on the wage elasticity of labour
demand is
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( )eLLe
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M
www +--= 21ˆ ghh .                                                                             (A2)
We can write ( )Mew
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w
eLew -=÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -= --- hhhh
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w
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gghh hhhh +-+-= ---- 11 1 . Using MeLew +=- hh  we can show after
calculations that ( ) ( )MeL
w
eLLe ww +÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ --=+
gh 1 . Therefore, the total wage
elasticity of labour demand in terms of the base wage in the presence of outsourcing
can be expressed in (12b). QED.
APPENDIX 2:
Differentiating the implicit wage formation (10) with respect to the base wage and
outsourcing gives
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which can be expressed as
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Using equation (10), i.e. ( ) ( )[ ]
h
tgth
ˆ
11ˆ ---
=
wb , the relationship between the wage
formation and outsourcing can be written as  equation (14).
Differentiating the equation (10) with the base wage and profit sharing gives
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APPENDIX 3:
Using the first-order condition for profit share commitment given outsourcing, i.e.
( ) 01 =-+- tptp  so that 0>tp  and we can rewrite it as follows
[ ] ( ) ( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ --=-+
-
--
w
wwLMc
e
wMew
g
g
t
t
h
thh 1
1
1 11 , which is equivalent to
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ --=-úû
ù
êë
é +
- w
wwLMc
e
wMwL gg
g
t
h
t)1()(
1
1 .                                               (A6)
This can be expressed as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11111 -÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ --=--+ h
t
g
t
thh t
w
w
wL
Mc
eL
M  so that
given outsourcing M  the optimal committed profit sharing can be presented as
( )
( ) ( ) ( )ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -+--+
-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -
=
111
1
h
t
ghh
h
t
g
t
t
t
w
w
wL
Mc
eL
M
w
w
c                                                 (A7)
33
QED.
APPENDIX 4:
By differentiating the implicit profit share function (21a) with respect to the profit
sharing and the outsourcing gives the following total differential
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By using ee
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which gives (22a).
By differentiating the implicit profit share function (21a) with respect to the profit
sharing and the base wage gives the following total differential
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which gives (23a). QED.
APPENDIX 5:
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APPENDIX 6:
In the presence of outsourcing differentiating (31a) with respect to M  gives   -
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      where 0<cMA  and
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In the presence of outsourcing differentiating (31a) with respect to profit sharing gives
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 where ?=cAt  (see equation (15)) and
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .01ˆ1111 2222 >ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
--+÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +=-+
+-
=
w
Mec
eL
M
weL
M
eLwL
LMc
eL
eLLeM
K hh
t
g
hhh tttt
 QED.
